Public Assistance (Welfare).

Abstract

The Personal Responsibility and work opportunity reconciliation act (PROWORA) is public assistance supporting act that was enacted in 1996. The act was intended to decrease government dependency of poor parents partly through the promotion of marriage. Pre-reform assistance was thought of as a discouraging element for marriages because it basically offered monetary support to single mothers. However, the reforms in welfare could have in actual sense reduced incentives to get married by making women financially independent through the program’s focus on work. This paper utilizes statistics on divorces and marriages during 1989-2000; in finding out the significance of reforms as well as other variables on state levels of divorce and marriage rates. The outcome indicated that the effecting of the TANF is associated with divorce and marriage rates. This is similar to pre-TANF waivers offered by AFDC in some instances (Welfare Information Network, n.pag).


Hypothesis

The effect of welfare reforms on marital transition is significant because of various reasons. An increase in pay and marriage were regarded as the main routes that would lead most single mothers with children out of AFDC (Fitzgerald 1991). As a result any policies which discourage transition into a married status may lead to an increase in welfare dependency. The turn out of events would be troubling because welfare reforms and welfare is pegged on fixed time caps. Marital disruptions are the main cause of single women’s entry into AFDC programs, because most women encounter an economic decline after a divorce.


Introduction

The UnitedState of America’s welfare programs has had great changes in the 90’s. The changes include experimental initiations made by states which later culminated into the passage of the PRWORA act in 1996. The act’s goal was to reduce dependency on government provisions by poor parents through the promotion of marriage and enhancing job preparation. There are numerous literary pieces on the influence of welfare reforms on assisting the needy.


However, there is little research already done in establishing whether welfare reforms have had any influence on transition out of and into marriage. The influence of the welfare system on transitions of marriage has great policy implications given the fact that the government is initiating plans to utilize federal money in promoting marriages as an alternative for the public welfare programs. In earlier times (before the 90’s) the welfare programs were perceived to be providers of disincentives to unions of marriage because they offered monetary assistance to single mothers with children. This was perceived to be the greatest reason as to why many women prefer to be single mothers.


Already concluded studies indicate that generous federal assisted welfare schemes are associated with the increase in the rate of female headship in families as well as non-marital fertility and the absence high rates of marriage. The generous nature of the welfare programs is positively linked to divorce. However, empirical studies tend to be weak compared to other resultant outcomes linked to the structure of the family. PRWORA act’s goals include reduction of pregnancies before marriage and encouragement of the establishment and maintenance of families with both parents. The estimate of effects of assistance programs are mostly sensitive to the addition of individual and state fixed effects, and this generally results in a low level of significance. Studies conducted in earlier times found no significant effect, but; recent studies find great significance and influence on fertility and marriage.


Methods and materials

This study or research involved the use of secondary sources such as journals and reports made by groups that have studied the effect of welfare programs and marriage. The study also reviews trends and statistics prior to and after the implementation of the programs in order to find any differences that may be existent or not existent. Material sourced for the studies of this topic was mainly obtained from the library.


Results-Discussion

The research examined vital statistical data collected during 1989 to 2000 in order to determine the influence of welfare programs on marriages and divorces. The welfare programs have been blamed for the encouragement of single motherhood and high divorce rate because they offer monetary assistance to single parents. The evident challenge and problem is that the programs encourage single parenthood especially dominated by single mothers. The eventuality of the problem is that the state encourages the establishment and maintenance of single parent families. These same families are likely to produce more single parent families due to the fact that children grow up under poor conditions and are likely to fall back into poverty after some time because they lack proper parental guidance and support (Bitler et.al, 13).


The structure that exists in welfare programs influences the divorce and marriage incentives when the rules of the program exhibit differing benefits for single and married people. Benefits from AFDC were mainly available to single mothers who had dependent children as a result the AFDC program increased gains from divorce whilst decreasing gains from marriage. Conducted surveys typically depict that states which have generous welfare benefits have low rates of marriage and high rates compared to other states with less generous schemes (Welfare Information Network, n.pag). The analysis focused on the relation between divorce and marriage rates and two reform welfare variables. Regression coefficients from the variables of welfare reform measure the influence of the reforms on welfare in different states in a certain year in relation to AFDC programs put up in that particular state before implementation of TANF or AFDC waivers. Therefore, the estimates of coefficients of variables of welfare reforms measures the influence of TANF and waivers in relation to the effect caused by AFDC in a particular state, averaged across several states.


Two states first initiated main waivers in the AFDC program by 1992. In 1997 29 states had main waivers, and in 1998 TANF was initiated in 19 states whereas; the remaining states initiated TANF in 1997. Obtained means showed that the rates of marriage had gone low in states and years with waivers offered by the AFDC programs (Bitler et.al, 13). The average marriage rates were lower after TANF was initiated compared to years before the initiation of TANF. Average divorce rates also went down in states and years in which waivers from AFDC were offered and also in years or states after the initiation of TANF than averages in states during AFDC programs without provision of waivers. Trends show that states having AFDC-UP programs have high rates of divorce though AFDC-UP was supposed to encourage establishment and maintenance of families with both parents (Kernan & Belinda, 352). These observed trends may be as a result of other numerous factors which may not be related to welfare. The differences may result from different demographic compositions.


Conclusion

Observed trends show that states having covenant marriage have low divorce rates. The regressions have state pegged effects and these results are robust and include state trends. Adopting covenant marriage statutes could influence divorce rate instead of only reflecting pre-existent low propensities for marriage breaks in states which enact covenant marriage statutes. The enactment of such statutes may foster an environment with less divorces and stable marriages. The implementation of AFDC-UP program with the allowance or eligibility of families with two parents under some cases may actually reduce or mitigate the influence of earlier AFDC programs on divorce and marriage. Reforms in welfare may have both indirect and direct influence on marriage and divorce.


The reforms in welfare programs should expand eligibility so that they increase benefits of being in a marriage without influencing eligibility of families with two parents or reducing benefits of single people. Welfare reforms should also be tightened to make welfare programs less generous. Welfare reforms are key determinants of transitions out of wedlock and as such the reforms greatly influence many women and children. Welfare programs have discouraged divorce in marriages but it has had less significant effects amongst people that have not been married before. If the divorce numbers decline the due to welfare remarriages are also bound to decline as well; on average most divorcees remarry, and this happens in time span that is approximately three years.


These proposed solutions may aid in alleviating the effect of these programs on marriages and divorce. However, it has to be noted that the opening of eligibility to families with both parents may loosen the tightening of the program and end up straining the program. It also may be of little help because most of the families with two parents are able to cater for their living.


Conclusively, it can be stated that indeed there is great influence on marriage life that originates from welfare programs. The programs offer some financial independence to single parents and thus discourage marriages as well as further divorces though to a subtle level. The programs are well defined and focused, however; reforms to include families with both parents is very necessary in some circumstances. This is because there are cases of families with both parents who may be unable to cater for their family jointly.


Works Cited

Bitler et. Al. The Impact of Welfare Reform on Marriages and Divorce. Print. 2002.

Claudia-Mitchell, Kernan and Tucker, Belinda, M.The decline in marriage among African Americans: causes, consequences, and policy implications. Rusell Sage Foundation. Print. 1995.

Welfare Information Network. Controversy and Dilemma: the welfare dilemma. Web. 1995. <http://cwx.prenhall.com/bookbind/pubbooks/macionis7/chapter11/destinations4/deluxe-content.html>





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